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EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH
NORMAN F. BURKE*

APPROXIMATELY

ten years have passed since the Wagner Act'
was amended by the Labor Management Relations Act.' It was in
this latter enactment that Congress specifically dealt with the problem
of an employer's right to speak as a subject of labor legislation. The
broad policy question before the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts is to determine the balance to be struck where the employee's
right of self-organization comes in conflict with the employer's freedom
of speech as an individual. Implicit in the determination is the fact that
there exists in the nature of things the subtle influence beyond the mere
words inherent in an employer's speech to his employees due in large
part to the variance of economic power in the relationship. This situation
would quite naturally tend to impede an employee to some degree in the
exercise of a subjective freedom of choice in regard to organizational
matters. It was to this problem that the Congress addressed itself when
it amended section 8 by adding subsection c, the so-called employer free
speech amendment:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or bo
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." a

An attempt will be made to follow the development of the law in two
areas as affected and not affected by this congressional norm; to state
the present law, and to offer suggestions as to the future course of policy
where the present law is thought to be inadequate. The first area will
be a consideration of the question of the bounds of privileged speech and
the extent to which the circumstances surrounding the utterance enter
into a determination of the legal character of the speech. The second
inquiry will be into the problem raised by a "captive audience" speech.
THE PRIVILEGE To SPEAK

Decisions Priorto Section 8(c)
There was no substantive provision dealing with employer expression
as such under the Wagner Act. But since in section 7 of that Act employees were protected in the exercise of ". . . the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations .. .",4 and since it was an
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-68 (1956).
2. 51 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-97 (1956).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c) (1956).
4. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1956).
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unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7,"
the Board concluded that it was an unfair labor practice for the employer
either by speech or by the distribution of literature to express his antiunion sentiments. 6 The Board showed little concern for the traditional
notion that in a democratic society, before action is taken, both sides
of any question should be heard. One factor the Board found of particular significance was the economic dependence of the employee on his
employer; the employee's job was held at the will of the employer, and
the will of the employer was generally not sympathetic toward employees
who participated in union activity. Employees in this position could
hardly give little weight to the views that their employer advocated. The
Board, realizing the inherent coercive nature
of any such speech, de7
manded virtual neutrality of the employer.
The Supreme Court in the VirginiaPower case,8 one of its few decisions
in the area of the interplay of the constitutional right of free speech and
of the rights created by labor legislation, gave a less than clear view of
its approval or disapproval of prior Board policy. The employer in this
case had posted a bulletin and made speeches which the Court found in
and of themselves to be noncoercive unless they were viewed in light of
the circumstances in which they occurred. Since it was not clear upon
what grounds the Board had based its unfair labor practice finding, the
Court remanded the case. The Court subscribed to a "totality of conduct" test in holding that although the statements were not coercive as
such their legality should be determined "by reliance on the surrounding
circumstances." 9
In the period between the Virginia Power decision in 1941 and the
section 8 (c) amendment some of the courts of appeals refused to enforce
Board orders based on unfair labor practice findings arising from employer speech.' ° These cases rejected any duty of the employer to remain
5. 29 U.S.C.A. § 15S(a) (1) (1956).
6. E.g., The Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 335 (1933) (handbill); Pacific
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431 (1936) (speech).
7. E.g., Williams Mlfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 135 (1933); Harrisburg Children's Dres Co,
2 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1937). As a court of appeals more succinctly phrased the problem:
"The position of the employer ... carries such weight and influence that his words may

be coercive when they would not be so if the relation of master and servant did not exist. 3
NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F.2d 33, 3S9 (7th Cir. 1939).
8. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
9. Id. at 479.
10. NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. J. L.
Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556 (Sth Cir. 1944); Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922
(3d Cir. 1944); NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 763 (1943).
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neutral and, absent statements of an outright threatening nature, the
employer was held privileged to state his views. In each case the courts,
while recognizing the Virginia Power decision as binding authority,
seemed reluctant to look beyond the immediate conduct of the employer
as the Supreme Court had allowed the Board to do. These decisions manifested the kind of concern for free speech which the Board had not found
persuasive. This approach of the several courts of appeals began to
be reflected in the Board's decisions toward the end of the period as it
dismissed some complaints that clearly fell within the earlier proscriptions of the Board in the late nineteen thirties. 1 While this change of
Board attitude was only one of degree and not of kind, one cannot help
but wonder whether the Board had one ear turned toward the halls of
Congress where debate was in progress on the proposed amendments to
the Wagner Act.
Legislative History of Section 8(c)
This, in brief, was the background which preceded the enactment of
the present section 8(c). The final version of the section was the distillate of two proposed bills that had little in common other than their
subject. Either provision standing alone would have presented few
problems of legislative intent. But when they were combined, Congress
produced a statute that was not a model of clarity. The House bill
provided that no employer speech would be, or be evidence of, an unfair
labor practice unless it contained "by its own terms" a threat of force
or economic reprisal.12 On the other hand, the Senate bill said that "if
such statement contains under all the circumstances no threat," it would
not be an unfair labor practice, and no reference was made to the statement's use as evidence of other unfair labor practices. 3 Senator Taft
said that he thought both groups' views on the subject conformed "substantially."' 4 This opinion seems strained, particularly when the committee reports are considered. The House Committee was far from satisfied with the Board's policy and would not only in effect abolish the
"totality of conduct" doctrine but also make noncoercive employer
speech inadmissible as evidence of other alleged unfair labor practices."
The Senate Committee tacitly approved the "totality" doctrine and
specifically said that statements could be used as evidence of other
11. E.g., United Welding Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 954 (1947); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
72 N.L.R.B. 132 (1947); Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp., 68 N.L.R.B. 805 (1946); and
Ebco Mfg. Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 210 (1946) (all reversing trial examiners' findings of unfair
labor practices arising from employer expression).
12. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1947).
13. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1947).
14. 93 Cong. Rec. 6443 (1947).
15. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947).
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unfair labor practices. 16 The conference agreement adopted the House
bill with the modification of omitting from it the phrase "by its terms"
and of adding to it the words "promises of benefit" found in the Senate
version. 7 As finally framed, then, the totality doctrine of the Virginia
Power case was not eliminated and the evidence exclusion rule remained 1
Before the substantive effect of the section is investigated a few comments may serve to point the direction. The Congress seemed to have
had three different problems in mind when section 8(c) was enacted.
First, Congress thought that in the administration of the Wagner Act
the Board had imposed too rigorous a standard in defining "coercion"
as applied to speech.' 9 The fact that the Board had modified its position

on this point apparently did not assuage most of the Congress. Although
there was a change in standards under the guise of a constitutional "free

speech" protection, it is submitted that the Board was not infringing
upon this Constitutional privilege to speak in an economic context during
the period of the Taft-Hartley debates. As the parallel area of the
degree of constitutional protection afforded picketing has developed, it

can be observed that expression when coupled with economic power is
considered by the Supreme Court to be different from and receives less
protection than a person's speech as an individual2 0
When the individual can reinforce his arguments with retaliation

against his audience through the exercise of his economic power, then
the statement should be recognized as being something more than an
exercise of free speech

21

Just as many forms of picketing are not

protected as a form of mere expression so most employer statements quz
16. Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947).
18. See generally, Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15-20 (1947).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. See e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) where the
Supreme Court upheld a state's issuance of an injunction against a union picketing to
compel an employer to violate state law. In reply to the union's contention that the
injunction invaded the picketers' freedom of speech, a portion of Mr. Justice Black's
answer was that: ". . . it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of spec.h or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
21. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 473 (1941): "In determining
whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, the
Board has a right to look at what the Company has said, as well as what it has done."
See also, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1945) where Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, said: 'qNo one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. But once he
uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their
action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the Fht
Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee."
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employer should be regarded as carrying a message which goes beyond
the traditional notion of speech as speech. 2 Be that as it may, section
8 (c) certainly gives an employer a statutory right to speak on the subject
of unionization under the conditions imposed by the section.2 ' Second,
Congress considered the situation where, although the alleged employer
speech complained of is not by its own terms an unfair labor practice,
when it is coupled with other circumstances surrounding the speech, it
supports the speech unfair labor practice charge. 4 Finally, Congress
evidenced an intent to legislate concerning the factual situation where an
employer's noncoercive statement is sought to be used as evidence of
another alleged unfair labor practice.2 5 The result of Congress's effort
will now be looked into more closely.
Decisions Subsequent to Section 8(c)
Section 8(c) by its term privileges employers' expressions which
are not a "threat of reprisal" or a "promise of benefit." Each phrase has
led to the creation of a body of decisions which has marked the bounds
where a statement of opinion or prophecy passes from the area of
privilege to that of a threat of reprisal and where a lawful reference to
past, present or future working conditions becomes an unlawful promise
of benefit.2 6 Where the line is drawn between these alternatives is difficult to determine and, more important, the criterion used is even more
elusive. The judgment process necessary to answer this question is
probably more peculiarly based on individual background and experience
of the members of the Board than any other in labor relations and to a
large extent has made precedent a shaky if not
meaningless basis upon
27
which to predict the result in a novel situation.
One of the constantly recurring alleged threats of reprisal is an employer's statement that if the plant is unionized it will close or move. In
the Chicopee Mfg. Corp. case,2" the Board certified an election even
22. For a contrary view see Rose, Is the NLRB Tampering with Freedom of Speech?,
15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 462 (1954), who contends that the Board's rulings on the subject of
employer speech have virtually always offended the constitutional right of free speech.
23. The Board felt that the ". . . section appears to enlarge somewhat the protection
previously accorded by the original statute and to grant immunity beyond that contemplated
by the free speech guarantees of the Constitution." 13 NLRB Ann. Rep. 49 (1948).
24. See note 15 supra.
25. See note 16 supra.

26. For a collection of decisions rendered during the first few years following the
enactment of § 8(c) see Daykin, The Employer's Right of Free Speech Under the TaftHartley Act, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 212, 223-28 (1952).
27. That this is particularly true when Board membership changes as a result of changes

in national administrations, see generally, Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board;
Herein of "Employer Persuasion", 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 594 (1954).
28. 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953).
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though prior to the election the employer had told an employee that "if
the union won, [the employer] ...would be forced to move the plant."
The new Board held the statements "... as nothing more than predictions of the possible impact of wage demands upon the Employer's business. A prophecy that unionization might ultimately lead to loss of
employment is no threat that the Employer will use its economic power
to make its prophecy come true." -3 Using this statement as a premise the
Board has reached different results in factual situations where the form
of expression used with respect to closing or moving varied slightly but
whose effect on the employees could hardly have been as discreetly
measured and weighed to justify the variance in the decisions; thus these
decisions place a premium on form rather than substance.~'
There is at least one issue which the Board has decided almost uniformly and that is that employer statements which "threaten" employees
with discharge for participation in union activities are unlawful3 1 Less
direct and more carefully prepared antiunion campaigning has been
allowed where the statements are deemed to have been made in answer
to union propaganda. 3 Some statements on the other hand take such a
patently unlawful form that their presence only reflects a complete
disregard for or of the NLRA 3 M any cases have presented a rather
clear situation of a "promise of benefit" when an employer, for example,
conditions the granting of a wage increase34 or the improvement of working conditionss upon a no-union vote by the employees. Short of such
direct promise the employer is privileged to recount to his employees
the benefits of the past. 6
With respect to the question of whether under section 8(c) the Board
29. Id. at 107.
30. Compare Senorita Hosiery Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1956) and The Lux
Clock Mlfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955) (holding that the expression was not an unfair
labor practice since it was only a prediction of the economic consequences of unionization),
with Lanthier Mlach. Works, 116 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1956), Sardis Luggage Co., 114 N.L.R.B.

446 (1955), and Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954) (holding that the expression was an unfair labor practice since it was a threat to dose the plant rather than
operate with a union in the plant).
31. E.g., Reeves Bros., 116 N.L.R.B. 422 (1956); Raymond Pearson, Inc, 115 N.L.R.B.
190 (1956); Delta Finishing Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 659 (1955).
32. E.g., Robberson Steel Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 344 (1955).
33. E.g., Margaret Ann Grocery Stores, 115 N.L.R.B. 1676 (1956); Vanadium Corp.,
114 N.L.R.B. 428 (1955); Campbell Coal Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 941 (1955).
34. E.g., Vancouver Plywood Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1476 (1956); Wilson & Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 327 (1956); Southwestern Motor Truck Lines, 113 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1955).
35. E.g., Rugcrafters of Puerto Rico, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 724 (1955).
36. E.g., Stratford Furniture Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1721 (1956); American Laundry
Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953) (the Board refused to set aside an election even
though the statement "incidentally" announced a wage increase).
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could consider factors other than the employer's speech in determining
whether the speech was an unfair labor practice, the Board's course has
had a shifting history. In its early administration of section 8(c), absent
a situation where the speech and conduct were "one, 1 7 the Board refused
to consider as a basis of a speech unfair labor practice finding the circumstances accompanying the speech, and a fortiori, the employer's past
history of labor relations.8" This view was abandoned several years later.
In reviewing a trial examiner's finding of an alleged threat of reprisal
the Board stated that "the substance and context of the statement, and
the position of the speaker in relation to his audience, are equally, if not
more significant factors in determining whether a statement is free from
any threat of reprisal or promise of benefit."8 9 While it was questionable
whether the scope of inquiry would be extended beyond the immediate
circumstances of the speech, under recent decisions the coerciveness of
the expression will be "determined by viewing the entirety of an employer's statements and actions."40
The most informative court of appeals case on this question is NLRB
v. Kropp Forge Co.4 The Board had based a pre-section 8(c) unfair
labor practice finding upon two conversations which were part of a
campaign by the employer to maintain a company union, but in themselves contained no threats or promises.4 2 When the Board petitioned
the court of appeals for enforcement the employer argued that the newly
enacted section 8(c) forbade only the use of statements "in themselves"
threatening or promising. The court rejected this argument in granting
enforcement and concluded that the expressions were to be considered,
as they had been before 1947, as part of a course of conduct of the
employer. The court stated:
"It also seems clear to us that in considering whether such statements or expressions are protected by Section 8(c) of the Act, they cannot be considered as isolated
words cut off from the relevant circumstances and background in which they are
37. Alliance Rubber Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 514 (1948) (employer's "total conduct" of coupling
a speech with a poll of his employees immediately thereafter held unlawful).
38. Tygart Sportswear Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 613 (1948); The Bailey Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 941
(1948).
39. J. S. Abercrombie Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 524, 530 (1949), petition for review denied,
180 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1950). See also Cary Lumber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 406 (1953).
40. The Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1196 (1955). See also West Point
Mfg. Co.,,115 N.L.R.B. 448 (1956); Cornell-Dubiller Elec. Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 277 (1955).
41. 178 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950). In view of the
variance between the Senate and House bills and reports on this question, a court would
seem justified in ignoring the legislative history. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes,
"We do not inquire what the legislator meant; we ask only what the statute means."
Holmes, Theory of Legal Interpretation, in Collected Legal Papers 203, 207 (1921).
42. Kropp Forge Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 617 (1946).
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spoken. A statement considered only as to the words it contains might seem a
perfectly innocent statement, including neither a threat nor a promise. But, when
the same statement is made by an employer to his employees, and we consider the
relation of the parties, the surrounding circumstances, related statements and events
and the background of the employer's actions, we may find that the statement is a
part of a general pattern which discloses action by the employer so coercive as to
entirely destroy his employees' freedom of choice and action. To permit statements
or expressions to be used on the theory that they are protected either by the First
Amendment or by Section 8(c) of the Act would be in violation of Section 7 and
contrary to the expressed purpose of the Act. Therefore, in determining whether
such statements and expressions constitute, or are evidence of unfair labor practice,
they must be considered in connection with the position of the parties, with the background and circumstances under which they are made, and with the general conduct
of the parties. If when so considered, such statements form a part of a general
pattern or course of conduct which constitutes coercion and deprives the employees
of their free choice guaranteed by Section 7,such statements must still be considered
as a basis for a finding of unfair labor practice. To hold otherwise would nullify the
guaranty' of employees' freedom of action and choice which Section 7 of the Act
provides. Congress, in enacting Section 8(c) could not have intended that
expressly
43
result."

This same interpretation of section 8(c) has been followed by other
courts of appeals both in granting and denying enforcement of Board
orders." These decisions revived the "totality of conduct" doctrine
and reflect the realistic view that words often have meaning only when
considered under the circumstances in which they were expressed.
The question of whether noncoercive expression could be used as
evidence of other unfair labor practices was considered shortly after the
passage of section 8(c). The Board followed the command of the statute
and refused to base its findings upon employer statements which would
naturally have given meaning to the acts in question. 5 The exclusion of
an expression as evidence, of course, is only commanded by the statute
if the statement is privileged. That is, a threatening remark, not being
within the terms of section 8(c), may be used as evidence. 0 This fact is
important for in many cases the employer's conduct includes threatening
43. 17S F.2d at 82S-29. Approved and applied expressly in Richards and As-ociates,
110 N.L.R.B. 132, 139-40 (1954).
44. NLRB v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Dills, 175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949) and NLRB
v. Gate City Cotton AMlls, 167 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1948) (both granting enforcement);
NLRB v. Coming Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422 (lst Cir. 1953) and NLRB v. Arthur Winer
Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1952) (both denying enforcement).
45. Consumers Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 77 N.L.R.B. 528 (1948) (alleged discriminatory discharge).
46. Nash-Finch Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953), enforcement denied on other grounds,
211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954) (the Board considered an employer's threats even though they
were made more than six months before the filing of a charge under § 8(a)(3)).
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words; these expressions may be used in determining whether other
alleged unfair labor practices are present.
The motivation for an employer's conduct is of critical importance
in determining the lawfulness of his actions. This is true whether the
issue be one of measuring his good faith in bargaining4 8 or his reason
for discharge of an employee.4 9 A literal reading of section 8(c) would
certainly stultify the inquiry into an employer's motive by denying the
Board the use of an important source of evidence. Consideration of an
employer's remarks in most cases would not be conclusive of an issue but
they certainly would be influential in making any intelligent judgment.
This would be true whether the allegation be of a violation of either the
duty to bargain collectively or the obligation to refrain from discriminatory conduct. But in the face of the evidentiary provision of section 8 (c),
the Board only on rare occasions has failed to follow the statute in its
literal terms. Several years after section 8(c) was enacted, in the LongLewis case,"0 the Board was willing to consider an employer's antiunion
speech as evidence in determining his motive. In that case, the Board
based a finding of a violation of section 8(a) (5) upon conduct including
an antiunion speech, some portions of which were held not violative of
section 8 (a) (1), delivered to his employees immediately after he received
the union's request to negotiate a contract. In a recent case8" where a
discriminatory discharge was found, the Board adopted the trial examiner's conclusion based upon evidence which included a privileged
47. E.g., Howard-Cooper Corp., 39 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1957); Harrisburg Bldg. Units Co.,
116 N.L.R.B. 339 (1956); Merchandiser Press, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1956); and Ben
Corson Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 323 (1955) (threats used as evidence of a refusal to
bargain); Wilson & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 327 (1956); Raymond Pearson, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B.
190 (1956); Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 115 N.R.B. 107 (1956); and United CigarWhelan Stores Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 1219 (1955) (threats used as evidence of a discriminatory
discharge).
48. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) defines the
duty to bargain as ". . . the obligation of the parties to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort
must be made to reach a common ground." Such a subjective standard places emphasis on
the parties' motivation.
49. St. Louis Car Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1523, 1524-25 (1954), posed the importance of
determining an employer's motive in discharge cases well, when the Board said, "the
question of determining the motive that prompted an employer in effecting a discharge
is inherently difficult. The professed motive is not always the real one. There is no ready
made measuring rod by which it is possible to determine whether the professed motive Is
in fact the true motive or only a subtle pretext intended to disguise an unlawful one.
The Board brings to bear on this question its considerable experience in appraising motives
in related situations and its collective good sense and judgment."
50. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1403 .(1950).
51. Southern Desk Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1956).

1957[

EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH

antiunion notice and letter. The examiner admitted the evidence over
objection of the employer solely for the purpose of showing the employer's hostility to unionization activities in the past.
The two court of appeals cases in point have grudgingly recognized
the importance of an employer's expression as an element in determining the legality of any act in labor relations. In the case of Pittsburgh
S.S. Co. v. NLRB12 the Board had based its finding of an unfair labor
practice of general antiunion conduct on two groups of nonthreatening
letters sent to the employees just prior to an election. The court stated
that section 8(c) "was specifically intended to prevent the Board from
using unrelated noncoercive expressions of opinion on union matters as
evidence of a general course of unfair labor conduct." 3 Using this statement as their premise they concluded that while the letters were not unrelated and were to be considered on their merits, the Board's findings
could not be supported, and therefore enforcement was denied.
The Indiana Metal case 4 presented the Seventh Circuit with two
distinct opportunities to consider the problem. First, in refusing to
enforce the portion of the Board's order grounded upon an alleged
discriminatory discharge, the court held that nonthreatening letters sent
by an employer to his workers were inadmissible as evidence when they
were sent four weeks after the firing which was the basis of the charge.
Second, with respect to an alleged violation of section 8(a) (1) in instituting paid holidays and an insurance program, the court sustained a
Board finding that the employer committed an unfair labor practice.
The Board had held that the institution of these new benefits was an
attempt to influence the employees in the selection of a representative
and thus it was unlawfulU' This finding was based upon such evidence
as the timing of the announcement of the holiday pay and insurance contracts, the employer's financial position, and also the sending of several
letters to the employees reminding them of the new benefits." It would
seem that by sustaining the Board the court approved of the use of the
privileged letters as evidence in support of the charge and this position
would appear particularly sound where, as here, the employer's motive in
instituting such benefits might otherwise remain ambiguous. On the
52. 1S0 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 493 (1951). With respect to the
court of appeal's treatment of the evidence question, the Supreme Court commented:
"Since we do not disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that these letters are
not substantial evidence of an unfair labor practice, we express no opinion on the poz-ible
effect of § 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act." 340 U.S. at 501, n.
53. Id. at 735.
54. Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
55. Indiana Metal Products Corp., 100 N.L.R3. 1040, 1041 (1952).
56. Id. at 1042-43.
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other hand, it might be argued that the theory of the court of appeals
was that the benefits and the letters to the employees were not severable
and that this conduct in its entirety was unlawful. While the court's
opinion on the question is not unequivocal it would appear that it concluded that the creation of the new economic benefits timed as they were
during an organizing campaign was unlawful and that the letters were
used as evidence illuminating the employer's intent." The Seventh
Circuit was thus willing in one instance to bar and in another to allow
the use of employer expression as evidence.
Both cases appear to support the proposition that the expressions of
an employer may be used as evidence at least when they are temporally
related to the alleged unfair labor practice. These two courts of appeals
have successfully ameliorated some of the thrust of section 8(c) as a
rule of evidence. In each case the declarations allowed amounted to
no more than the application of the common-law verbal act doctrine.
Senator Taft specifically indorsed this interpretation of the evidence
provision. 58 The Board would do well to follow the same tack.
There was another field of Board activity where what an employer
said might carry with it the kind of influence which would not allow the
freedom to participate in union activities that the Wagner Act contemplated. This area was representation elections. Before the 1947
amendments the Board had applied the equivalent standard in exercising
its discretion whether to set an election aside as it had in determining
whether an unfair labor practice had occurredY
Although by its terms section 8(c) spoke only of employer speech in
situations where alleged unfair labor practices had been committed, the
80th Congress undoubtedly contemplated that the section would be
equally applicable to representation cases. This may be inferred from
the attitude of the Congress in general on the subject of employer
speech ° and more specifically from the fact that the Board had an
57. "In the literature which the union distributed among the employees, It listed
insurance benefits paid for by the employer among benefits which the union had achieved
in other plants. Where economic benefits are instituted for the purpose of thwarting selforganization, the courts have held the same to be an unlawful interference. . . . The
Board found unlawful interference and there is substantial evidence in the record to sustain
such finding." 202 F.2d at 620.
58. "It should be noted that this subsection is limited to 'views, argument, or opinion'
and does not cover instructions, directions, or other statements which might be deemed
admissions under ordinary rules of evidence. In other words this section does not make
incompetent, evidence which would ordinarily be deemed relevant and admissible in courts
of law." 93 Cong. Rec. 6444 (1947).
59. E.g., Hercules Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 650 (1947); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 1368 (1946); Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp., 68 N.L.R.B. 805
(1946).
60. See note 17 supra.
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established practice in the past of applying the same standard in both
situations. The Board, however, ignored its former equation when it
decided the General Shoe case in 1948.1 It held in that case that even
though an employer's expression contained no threat of reprisal or
promise of benefit and therefore was not an unfair labor practice, the
election would be set aside since the employer's conduct "created an
atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the
employees. ' One commentator while voicing the opinion that "in creating the dichotomy between unfair labor practices and representation
cases, the Board appears to be in the inconsistent position of construing
legally non-coercive expression of opinion as creative of an illegally
coercive atmosphere,"0 3 nevertheless approved of the decision. The
only legal justification for the decision would appear to be that it allowed
the Board to give content to otherwise equivocal words by considering
the circumstances surrounding the expression at a time when section
8(c) had not been given workable context by the courts and to give
recognition to conduct that could not be imputed to the employer under
the then new Taft-Hartley agency provisions. While the case was followed in 1950," when the personnel of the Board changed in 1953 the
practice was tacitly overruled. 5 Particularly with the expansion of the
permissible area of inquiry to which employer expression is now subject
6 the Board's former policy which
under such cases as Kropp Forge,"
7
flouted the statute seems wisely abandonedG
TiE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE PROBLEM

During the early administration of the Wagner Act when the Board
demanded neutrality of employers with respect to their union senti61. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
62. Id- at 126.
63. Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of TaftHartley Section S(c), 5S Yale LJ. 165, 174 (1948).
64. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950).
65. L. G. Everist, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. S10 (1955); Repcal Brass Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.RB.
193 (1954); A. S. Abell Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 362 (1953); National Furniture Mfg. Co., 105
N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953). In 1954, among the proposed amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act
included in S. 2650 was one which would have amended section 8(c) by adding to it the
clause: "nor shall it be the basis for setting aside an election conducted under section 9."
100 Cong. Rec. 93 (1954). This proposed amendment was not reported out of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare at the end of the S3d Congress.
66. See pp. 272-73 supra.
67. There were some practical procedural disadvantages to the Board's practice under
the General Shoe philosophy. The Board could not order the employer to cease and desist
from his interference where his conduct did not amount to an unfair labor practice; thus
enabling him to postpone an election through his own conduct. Conversely, since the
setting aside of an election is probably not a final order, the employer could not get
judicial review on that Board determination. See note 63 supra.
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ments the fact that an employer assembled and delivered an antiunion
speech on company time and property to his employees, a "captive
audience," was not critical. If the speech without more was considered
coercive then investigation into the surroundings was hardly needed.
When the Supreme Court in the Virginia Power case indicated that, in
situations where more was needed to sustain an unfair labor practice
based on an alleged coercive speech than the speech itself, the Board
might look at the circumstances surrounding the speech, it was natural
for the Board to consider the fact that the speech was given at the
factory on company time. This setting added an additional psychological
barrier to the imbalance present due to the difference in economic power.
For example, in American Tube Bending Co., 8 the employer combined
letters to his employees with a speech on the day before an election to
an assembly of workers in the plant on working time to express his antiunion sentiments. The Board placed emphasis in its finding of a violation
of section 8(a) (1) on the fact that the speech here "... brought heavily
into play the economic dependence of the employees upon the [employer]
for their livelihood," 69 and thus on the record as a whole supported
the charge. The Board was unsuccessful in its attempt to have its order
enforced and the court of appeals ignored the factor of the nature of the
audience.70
The sensitiveness which the Board had for mass-assembly speech was
brought out strongly in Clark Bros. Co."1 In addition to other conduct
that was found to be unlawful, the employer suspended operations one
hour before an election and gave an antiunion speech to an assembly of
employees during working time. The Board held that the compelling of
workers to listen to the speech was in itself a violation of their rights
guaranteed under section 7. The Board did not base their finding, as
the trial examiner had, on a "constitutional right of non-assembly," but
rather on the fact that the exercise of the employer's economic power in
compelling the employees to listen itself deprived the employees of free
choice. 72 The court of appeals granted enforcement of the Board's order
but not on the grounds that the act of compelling the employees to listen
was unlawful. 73 While the court concluded that under the circumstances
...

68. 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942).
69. Id. at 133.
70. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 768 (1943).
71. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
72. Id. at 805, where the Board said, "...
we must perform our function of protecting

employees against that use of the employer's economic power which is inherent in his ability
to control their actions during working hours. Such use of his power is an independent

circumstance, the nature and effect of which are to be independently appraised."
73.

NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the employer's remarks were coercive, it stated by way of dictum in
answer to the Board's contention that the "captive audience" was per se
an unfair labor practice, that "We should hesitate to hold that he may
not do this on company time and pay, provided a similar opportunity to
address them were accorded representatives of the union."74 This thought
was the harbinger of later Board action.
Although the court of appeals was reticent to voice its approval or
disapproval of the Board's theory in Clark Bros., the Congress was not.
The Senate was sufficiently disturbed by the Board's decision to mention
it by name as one of a brace of cases which it was their intent that section 8(c) overrule.Y The Board was responsive to this expression of
Congress and when the first opportunity presented itself declared that
as such could not be the basis of an unthe compulsory audience speech
76
fair labor practice finding.
The Bonwit Teller Case and Doctrine
The importance of the compulsory audience as a factor or element of
coercion was slight until the Bonwit Teller decision in 19517 The
employer, a department store, had a no-solicitation rule which applied
during working and nonworking hours on the selling floor. This rule was
privileged due to the nature of its business 7 After having made a noncoercive antiunion speech during working hours six days before an
election, the employer refused the union's request for an opportunity to
reply under similar circumstances. The Board held the refusal to be
the basis of an unfair labor practice finding upon two alternative
grounds. First, the enforcement of a valid, broad no-solicitation rule
violates section 8(a) (1) when the rule is applied discriminatively. It
is applied with discrimination where, as here, the employer seeks to
campaign verbally and denies the union an opportunity to reply. Second,
"that the right of employees, guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, freely
to select or reject representation by a labor organization necessarily encompasses the right to hear both sides of the story under circumstances
which reasonably approximate equality."I7 The Board grasped the
suggestion that the court of appeals had made in the Clark Bros. case
and emphasized that it was what the employer refused to do, not what
he did or said that violated the NLRA. Under its second criterion the
74. Id. at 376.
75. See note 16 supra.
76. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 NL.R.B. 577 (1943).
77. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 NL.R.B. 603 (1951).
78. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953) (extends the
privilege to public nonselling areas and nonpublic employee cafeterias).
79. 96 NL.R.B. at 612.
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Board noted that due to the circumstances of the case and in the light
of the other unfair labor practices committed it was not satisfied, regardless of the fact, as the dissent pointed out, that there were meeting halls
available in the metropolitan area.
When the Board sought enforcement of its order, the Second Circuit
affirmed the finding but only upon the theory that there had been a discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule. 0 This interference
with the employees' right to organize arose where the employer enforced
a privileged no-solicitation rule against the employees while itself
delivering an antiunion speech on company time and property. Under
the court's theory, if the employer abandoned the rule it would have
no duty to give the union an opportunity to reply. The Board's order,
however, was based upon its second rationale for it hid ordered that
the employer grant the union equal opportunity to speak each time the
employer spoke, regardless of the absence of a rule.81 Since the Second
Circuit's theory of what constituted the unfair labor practice was based
upon a narrower ground than that on which the Board's order was
framed, it refused to enforce the order and remanded the case to the
Board for the appropriate modification. 2
The Second Circuit again applied this discrimination theory in the
American Tube Bending case. 3 In this case an industrial employer had
a rule which was unlawful under the Republic Aviation rule 4 in that it
barred solicitation during nonworking time. The employer's speech to
the employees while the unlawful rule was in effect was held to be an
unfair labor practice even though the remarks were otherwise privileged
under section 8(c). These two Second Circuit decisions rejected the
Board's equal opportunity doctrine. If there was any doubt of this after
Bonwit Teller, it was settled in American Tube, where the court said that
if ". . . the Board's order in the case at bar had depended upon the
[employer's] refusal, or failure, to allow [the union representative] ...
to address the employees on the property during working hours it could
not stand."8 5 Thus the rule of the two cases is that it was an unfair
labor practice to discriminate against the employees and it was an unlawful discrimination to establish a privileged no-solicitation rule or an
invalid no-solicitation rule while presenting an antiunion noncoercive
speech.
80. Bonwit Teller, Inc., v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
905 (1953).
81. 96 N.L.R.B. at 615.
82. Chief Judge Swan, dissenting, who wrote the Clark Bros. opinion, see note 73
supra, said that § 8(c) privileged the statements. 197 F.2d at 646.
83. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).
84. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
85. 205 F.2d at 46.
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The progeny of the Bonwit Teller case did not have as a basis the
narrow theory of the Second Circuit. Rather, stress was given to the
second rationale of the Board's decision in the Bonwit Teller case, that
is, the equal opportunity concept. Elections were set aside regardless of
the absence of a no-solicitation rule when equal opportunity was not
given to the union to reply.s6 The equal opportunity reasoning was also
applied in unfair labor practice proceedings. In MetropolitanAuto Parts,
Inc., 7 the employer made a noncoercive speech on company time and
property while ignoring the union's request to be allowed to reply.
The Board found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice even
though he had neither a no-solicitation rule nor was it shown that facilities other than the employer's shop were inadequate for the union's purposes. The broad reach of the Bonwit Teller doctrine was based on the
employer speaking and not affording the union equal opportunity to
reply and therefore gave the employer a choice; he could remain silent
with respect to organizational affairs when addressing a "captive audience" and thus keep the union from claiming time to speak during
working hours, or, if he did speak and the union requested an opportunity to reply, he must allow the union the use of substantially the same
forum. By no means a Hobson's choice, this was another attempt by
the Board to deal with the "captive audience" in the light of the realities
surrounding organizational activity.
The Livingston Shirt Decision
These alternatives were not to confront employers for long. In a
matter of months after these decisions which gave broadest extension to
the Bonvit Teller case,"" the Board with its reconstituted membership
decided Livingston Shirt."' The case was set in the not uncommon situation in the South of an alignment of the forces of the community with
the industrial employer to enter the lists against the would-be union. The
employer had a no-solicitation rule which forbade organizational activities only during working hours. His antiunion activity included several
noncoercive speeches to the assembled employees during working hours
while denying the union equal opportunity to reply. After several elections, which the union lost, had been set aside, the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge. The Board majority dismissed the complaint,
holding:
86. E.g., Bernardin Bottle Cap Co., 97
97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
87. 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953). Followed
(1953); Seamprufe, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 298
88. Ibid.
89. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B.

N.L.R.B. 1559 (1952); Biltmore Mfg. Co.,
in Onondaga Pottery Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 770
(1953).
400 (1953).
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"that, in the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule (prohibiting
union access to company premises on other than working time) or a privileged nosolicitation rule (broad, but not unlawful because of the character of the business),
an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection speech
on company time and premises to his employees and denies the union's request for
an opportunity to reply.' ' °
In a representation case decided the same day, Peerless Plywood Co.,91
the Board set aside an election where the employer had delivered an
otherwise privileged speech less than twenty-four hours before the election. Basing its rationale on the intrinsic nature of such a speech to upset
the unfettered choice of representatives by the employees, the Board announced the rule that any electioneering speech by either the employer
or the union to a compulsory assembly of workers on company time less
than twenty-four hours before an election would be grounds for setting
the election aside. 2
The ruling of the Livingston Shirt case abolished the broad Bonwit
Teller doctrine by rejecting the alternative rationale in the Bonwit Teller
case, namely, that section 7 guarantees to employees the right to "hear
both sides under circumstances which approximate equality. 03a If this
reassessment of what standard will satisfy the employees' needs to hear
both the pros and cons on organizational activity before exercising their
right of choice is accepted, then the reasoning of Chairman Farmer and
Member Rodgers with respect to section 8(c) seems persuasive. If the
exercise of a statutory privilege of speech imposes a correlative duty to
donate working time to the union to reply, then the privilege is to a
great degree emasculated. The fact that the Board itself "grafted" a
proscription on employer speech by the Peerless rule does not detract
from the statutory application adopted, for the twenty-four hour election rule almost assumes de minimis proportions in comparison with
the burden placed upon an employer under the broad Bonwit Teller
doctrine. The Peerless rule does, however, reflect the view that the
present Board recognizes that when an employer speaks he is exercising
more than a constitutional right of free speech. That is, it is doubtful
that an employer could successfully object to the setting aside of an
election under the Peerless rule on the grounds of impairment of his
right of speech. 94
90. Id. at 409.
91.

107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).

92.

Id. at 429. For some of the wrinkles which have been developed in the application

of this arbitrary rule, see 21 NLRB Ann. Rep. 69-70 (1956); 20 NLRB Ann. Rep. 59-60
(1955); 19 NLRB Ann. Rep. 64-66 (1954).

93. 107 N.L.R.B. at 406.
94. Cf. NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649 (4th Cir), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955). The Fourth Circuit in reviewing the Board's finding of a
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It is to the major premise of the Livingston Shirt decision, that is, the
reassessment, that Member Murdock, dissenting, aimed his most effective fire. He stated the basic issue of the case very well when he asked
whether,
v.
in fact, those means of communication available to a
union under normal circumstances are sufficient to meet the problems
posed by an employer's exclusive use of company time and property for
anti-union purposes." 91 While two members of the majority generalized
that the "time-honored and traditional means" of union organizing did
not include the employer's natural forum, Member M urdock argued from
experience that it was necessary to allow the union equal opportunity for
in no other manner could the union discount the employer's inherent
advantage. It would seem that the Board erred in not accepting Member
Murdock's poignant argument that the alternatives open to the union
are insubstantial in comparison with the employer's plant as a forum
and as a locus of authority. The dollar cost to an employer of allowing
the union time in most cases can hardly be considered an important
factor in rationalizing the decision, for over the long run the strife which
occurs in the organizational phase will tend to create antagonism on all
sides whether the workers eventually become organized or not. And,
after all, how serious can the financial burden be on an employer to allow
the union equal time if he can afford to take the plant's time to state his
own views? As was noted in the area of defining the permissible limits
of speech the decision of questions today running to the fundamentals
of the unionization of workers seems to be colored by a predisposition
which does not complement an expert body such as the NLRB.
Exceptions to the Livingston Shirt Rule
The extent to which the two exceptions to the general rule of Livingston Shirt were to be given recognition was soon tested. In one case the
Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 0 refused to enforce a
Board order based on a pre-Livingston Shirt ruling that an employer
had committed an unfair labor practice in a situation substantially the
refusal to bargain upheld the Board's action in setting aside an election where the employer
gave a captive audience speech several hours before the election without granting the union
an opportunity to reply. The court considered the Bonwit Teller doctrine controlling due
to the date when the election occurred, but the court's broad rationale would seem applicable to the Peerless rule. "The fact that the Board no longer follows the holding of
the Bonwit Teller case . .. is no reason why it should not bold such a speech prejudicial
to a fair election and set aside the result of the election on that ground. The question here
is not one of free speech or of unfair labor practices, but of the Board's judgment in
holding last minute, one sided appeals to employees on company time and property prejudicial to a fair election and setting the election aside for that reason." 224 F2d at 653.
95. 107 NT.R.B. at 421.
96. 214 F2d 7S (6th Cir. 1954).
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same as the original Bonwit Teller case. 7 The employer had a privileged
no-solicitation rule in force at his retail store, made a speech on company
time and property to his employees, and refused to grant the union a
similar opportunity to address the employees. The majority of the
court decided that the case was controlled by the privilege conferred by
section 8(c). Although the majority attempted to distinguish the Bonwit
Teller case, the reasoning of each court must be considered in conflict on
the issue of the effect of section 8(c) upon an employer's speech when
he attempts to enforce a privileged no-solicitation ruleY8
The Sixth Circuit's decision seems unsound as a matter of legal theory
and of labor policy. The employer who operates a retail store is given
the privilege of enforcing a no-solicitation rule in the first instance because, due to the nature of his business, the law has deemed that the
employees' right to organize must be sacrificed to the extent that such
activity interrupts the efficient operation of a retail establishment."
Few would argue that this is unreasonable for the probable disruptive
effect and confusion which would be engendered by allowing organizational activity to take place in the public and quasi-public areas of a
retail store might be great. But yet the very reason which justifies the
rule is gone when an employer speaks under those conditions. Once the
reason for the limitation on employees' rights is gone, it would seem
that the enforcement of the rule should be unlawful. The rule's sole
purpose becomes obviously one of frustrating organizational activities
in contradiction of section 7. As a matter of policy, a privileged no-solicitation rule should be confined to the limits of its justification, for such a
rule, even where justified, places the employees in a more difficult
position to obtain information about their rights as guaranteed by
federal law than would be true were the rule not present. Natural
reluctance of employees when away from the job to expend time and
97.

F. W. Woolworth Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953).

98. Compare Hand, J., "However, neither § 8(c) nor any issue of 'employer free speech'
is involved in this case.... Bonwit Teller chose to avail itself of that privilege [a privileged
no-solicitation rule] and, having done so, was in our opinion required to abstain from
campaigning against the Union on the same premises to which the Union was denied
access; if it should be otherwise, the practical advantage to the employer who was opposed
to unionization would constitute a serious interference with the right of his employees to
organize", Bonwit Teller, Inc., 197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905
(1953), with Allen, J., "In light of the sweeping statutory provision and the legislative

history [of § 8(c)] a no-solicitation rule cannot prevent an employer from conferring
with his employees on his own premises and on his own time and the rule is not discriminatorily applied because of the employer's refusal to permit the union to campaign
on its premises when there are adequate facilities for access to the employees." NLRB
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78, 81 (6th Cir. 1954).

99. See note 78 supra. See also. NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (8th
Cir. 1946).
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effort to hear both sides of organizational pros and cons makes enforcement of the rule all the more burdensome. The fear of employer surveillance undoubtedly adds to the distaste of attending union meetings off
the employer's premises.?° The Second Circuit's decision would seem
to be more enlightened.101
The other exception to Livingston Shirt was before the Board in
Johnston Lawn Mower Corp.0 2 The employer imposed upon its employees a no-solicitation rule which was unlawful since it applied to both
working and nonworking time. While this rule was being enforced it
carried on antiunion noncoercive campaigning during company time and
on company property. It rejected the union's request to be allowed opportunity to carry on electioneering under similar conditions. The Board
held "that the [employer] ... violated Section S(a) (1) of the Act (1) by
maintaining a rule prohibiting solicitation on company property during
nonworking hours, and (2) by campaigning against the Union on company time and property while enforcing such rule."' 0 3 The Board's
recognition of these two exceptions seems sound as a matter of legal
theory and fundamental policy. The extent to which the Sixth Circuit's
decision has cast a shadow of substance which other courts of appeals
will accept remains to be seen. 0 4 At present, the Woolworth case should
be considered cantat extra chorum.
Babcock & Wilcox Case and the Livingston Shirt Rule
One of the factors which seems to underlie the Board's decisions in
Livingston Shirt and the cases that have followed its theme is that the
union's ability to reach employees on the company's premises was preserved. That is, the Board's application of the Livingston Shirt rule
assumed that where it applies the union could not be denied access to
company property during nonworking time. Thus, in Livingston Shirt
the Board observed that "[the employer's] ... rule prohibited solicita100. E.g., Margaret Ann Grocery Stores, 115 N.L.R.B. 1676 (1956); United CigarWhelan Stores Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1956).
101. For a contrary view of the merits of the 'Woolworth decision see Comment, Labor
Relations-Free Speech for Whom?, 10 liami L.Q. 37, 43-45 (1955).
102. 110 N.L.R.B. 1955 (1954).
103. Id. at 1955-56; accord, Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 356 (1956). In
Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 10S6 (1954), the Board set aside an elctlon
on similar grounds.
104. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed the reasoning of the
Second Circuit and rejected that of the Sixth Circuit in resolving the question of the
effect of § 8(c) on distribution rules. The court held in United Steelworkers v. NLRB,

243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956), that an employer commits an unfair labor practice
when he enforces an employee no-distribution rule during nonworking time while at the

same time he distributes antiunion noncoercive literature.

This holding reversd the

Board's ruling on the point in Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154-55 (1955).
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tion only during working hours. This rule was therefore not unlawful.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the [union] ... was
denied access to [the employer's] . . .premises after working hours." 100
In the Rath Packing Co. case 0' the Board refused to set aside an election
where the employer did not grant the union's request to speak to the
employees after it learned that the employer had made a speech to the
employees on company time and property. There were no no-solicitation
rules in the plant and the employees were apparently free to discuss
union affairs at will. In answer to the union's argument that by "requesting" the union organizer not to park his car in the company parking lot
the employer violated the Livingston Shirt rule, the Board said "... . the
union representative entered the Employer's parking lot and spoke to
even after he had
the employees without objection by the Employer
07
agreed not to park on the Employer's property.'
It was in a parallel context that the Board's theory of the employer's
duty to open up its premises was upset. The context was whether an
employer committed an unfair labor practice by denying nonemployee
access to its property. The case was Babcock &
union organizers
08
Wilcox.1
The Steelworkers Union was attempting to organize a plant employing about 500, about forty per cent of whose employees lived in a town
of 21,000 located a few miles from the plant. No union member was an
employee. About ninety per cent of the employees reached the plant by
auto, using a driveway from the main highway to reach a parking lot
some one hundred yards away from this intersection. The union had on
three occasions distributed pamphlets at the intersection but this activity
was frustrated when the local police forbade the distribution because of
the traffic hazard created. The union made a request to the employer
to be allowed to distribute pamphlets in the company parking lot during
nonworking hours. The employer refused, stating that its policy had
been and would continue to be not to permit any distributions by any
group on its property.
The Board held the refusal an unfair labor practice and ordered the
employer to allow the union to distribute in the parking lot. 09 The
105.
106.

107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409.
115 N.L.R.B. 302 (1956).

107. Id. at 306. Where an illegal no-solicitation rule is an element of the unfair labor
practice the employer by abolishing the rule eliminates the basis of the finding under the
Second Circuit's reasoning. To this extent the suggestion in the text is limited. It should be
noted that in Willamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 356 (1956), some employees were
union members, while in Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1955, 1957 (1954),
the union had no employee members and was denied entry to the employer's premises.
108. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
109. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 493-94 (1954).
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Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on the grounds that the employees'
right to self-organize was not interfered with when nonemployee union
organizers were denied access to the premises.' ° The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit's distinction between the status of employees
and nonemployees but indicated that the circumstances of the situation
would be considered in determining whether the employees' rights under
section 7 were adequately protected, holding:
"that an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution
of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels
of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the
employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
distribution. In these circumstances the employer may not be compelled to allow
distribution. . . ."I-"

The question raised by the Babcock & Wilcox case when coupled with
the Livingston Shirt rule is whether an employer who has no union employees, and under the Supreme Court standard"" can keep the union off
the property, commits an unfair labor practice by speaking to his employees during company time "about" unionization while denying the
union equal opportunity to reply. It is not enough to say that since
facilities on the outside fulfilled the criterion of Babcock & Wilcox
initially that the question is answered. To the extent that it is more difficult for the organizing union to attempt to neutralize the antiunion
prophecies and warnings which are permitted today by the present Board
than it is for it to disseminate a general organizational "message" to employees in the Babcock & Wilcox sense, there is a distinction which
should make a legal difference. Putting the same thought in other terms,
the adequacy of "available channels" open to the union assumes a different proportion when the circumstances include an adamant employer
speech. A literal application of the Livingston Shirt rule would go far
enough toward denying employees their right to select a bargaining representative to be objectionable as violative of section 7. Two members
of the majority of the Board in the Livingston Shirt case justified their
decision on the grounds that barring the union from the use of the employer's forum would not interfere with union activity for one of the
110. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955). On similar grounds
the Tenth Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order issued in Seamprufe, Inc., 10g
N.L.R.B. 24 (1954) in NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1955). The
Sixth Circuit granted enforcement of a Board order issued in Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L..B.
998 (1954) in NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955) on si-mr facts. All
three cases were decided in 351 U.S. 105, the first two being affimed and the last bing
reversed.
111. 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
112. Ibid.
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".. . time-honored and traditional means by which unions have conducted
their organizational campaigns.. ." which remained was 1... individual

contact with employees on the employer's premises outside working
hours ... .,,ha But under the Babcock & Wilcox decision in the captive
audience context this is no longer true. To deny the union the medium
which the employer uses under these circumstances would give the union
virtually no way to discount the impact upon the employees which the
employer's words in their surroundings impart.
If this argument were sufficient to persuade the Board not to apply the
Livingston Shirt rule literally, then one alternative for the Board would
be to carve out an exception from its ambit. An exception to meet the
problem could be phrased as follows: for the employer to exercise his
right to keep a union off his premises while he both delivers an antiunion
speech to a captive audience and denies the union an opportunity to
reply under similar circumstances would be an unfair labor practice.
This exception would be a revival of the Bonwit Teller doctrine where
the three elements above were present. The choice for the employer who
wanted to make a captive audience speech would be either to allow the
union opportunity to reach the employees during nonworking time on
company premises or to allow it equal time at the same forum which
he used. Each alternative would be governed by the employer's policy
with respect to union access to company property. This result allows
the employer to call the tune and is consistent with the reasoning of the
majority" 4 in the Livingston Shirt case. The exception recognizes that
while the employer generally has a right of free speech and of unfettered
use of his property, when these two traditional values are placed in the
pans of the scale they are outweighed by the employees' guaranteed right
to self-organize.
But this type of argument can be used to prove too much. One criticism which could be made of the Board's various approaches in dealing
with the captive audience problem is that it resulted in a uniformity of
treatment regardless of the circumstances. Should a New England employer of several dozen employees who runs a small machine shop where
no effort is made to bar union representatives from the premises during
nonworking hours and a Southern industrial factory which is complete
with an industrial relations staff and antiunion history be governed by
the same immutable standard? If the hypothetical Northern employer
delivers innocuous remarks to an assembly of his employees about
113. 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406.
114. Since the Board split 2-2-1 there was no majority rationale. The concurring member did not adopt the reasoning of the other two members with whom be joined in voting

to dismiss the complaint.
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unionization and the Southern employer gives a blood-and-thunder "noncoercive" antiunion speech to a captive audience of his employees, should
both be treated the same, with the result that both have to allow the
union an equal opportunity to reply as would have been the case under
the Board's Bonwit Teller doctrine, or neither be required to allow the
union equal time as is the rule under Livingston Shirt?
The answer to both questions should be in the negative for the standard adopted should be more responsive to some of the circumstances
present in an organizational campaign at a particular company. Just
as the Bonwit Teller doctrine and the Livingston Shirt rule did not meet

this need, neither does an exception such as formulated to fit the Babcock
& Wilcox situation have sufficient flexibility. A rule governing this type
of organizational activity today which does not recognize at least the
differences in the geographical area of the country in which the activity
occurs, the relative strength of the union and an employer, and the
ability in fact of the union to reach the employees appears to be a headin-the-sand approach.
The solution is not an easy one. An arbitrary across-the-board rule
has some appeal. Whether it be in the form of Bomit Teller or Livingston Shirt, it allows the parties to predict in advance the legal consequences of their conduct, and the Board to administer a standard which
creates little call for their intervention. A rule, on the other hand, which
is sensitive to the circumstances places the Board in a better position to
effectuate the policies of the NLRA. In many cases the result will be the
same whether the criterion be rigid or supple. In the close case, however, one cannot use both principles; one cannot have both certainty of
result and flexibility; either alternative is paid for at a price. With the
variation in the acceptance of unionization as an integral part of industrial life in the present economy, it seems that recognition should be
given to the situation of the parties involved in the particular case.
In the near future the Board will undoubtedly be called upon to
pass on the applicability of the Livingston Shirt rule where an employer
under the Babcock & Wilcox case has kept the union off his property.
Any Board treatment of the captive audience problem should be responsive to the circumstances of the case. The present rule is not. Earlier
in this article it was suggested that the Board's reassessment of the
methods necessary to allow the union to disseminate and the employees
to receive adequate information was unsound. These two criticisms,
coupled with the fact that a factual situation will probably be before
the Board shortly, make a refocusing on the problem timely. It is hoped
that a reappraisal will lead the Board to overrule the Livingston Shirt
decision.
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A Proposed Alternative Theory
Having rejected the status quo it is necessary to offer an alternative
theory. This proposed standard is grounded on an analogy to Holmes'
prima facie theory of torts. 115 This rule would be that it is a prima facie
violation of section 8 (a) (1) for an employer to give a speech on company
time and property and to deny the union equal opportunity to reply
unless under the circumstances the refusal can be justified. This watereddown version of the Bonwit Teller doctrine would allow an employer to
come forward with evidence in an attempt to show that under the circumstances his refusal should not be deemed an interference with his
employees' rights under section 7. Over a period of time certain circumstances would become guideposts by which employers and unions could
govern their conduct. One factor which would be of importance would be
the presence or absence of union access to the employees during nonworking time on company property. This would help to ameliorate the
organizational barrier placed before the employees by the Babcock &
Wilcox rationale. If an employer showed that he was willing to allow
the union on the premises during nonworking time in some instances
this would justify his refusal. It is to be expected, however, in most
situations the employer would rather allow the union equal time to
answer his twenty or thirty minute speech than to open up the plant to
union organizers' campaigning during coffee breaks and lunch hours. On
the other hand, some situations might arise where the union would not
want the time to speak to the employees as its appeal to the employees
of an employer who has continuously stayed six months "ahead" of the
union would be fruitless, particularly if a recent installment of "benefits"
had been granted. Another factor would be the relative financial
strength of the union and the employer as tending to show who should
bear the economic burden of neutralizing employer captive audience
speeches. A third factor and probably the most important is the nature
of the community where the organizational activity takes place. This
encompasses the sophistication of the employees, the location of the plant,
the size of the town or city and its attitude toward labor organizations.
The generality of these guides and the myriad of factual situations
which potentially could confront the Board is appreciated. The Board's
job in a delicate area of labor relations is, however, more than to promulgate per se rules and to enforce them like a policeman. As the Supreme
Court has said "the detection and appraisal of . . .imponderables [is]
* . . indeed one of the essential functions of an expert administrative
agency.""' After some boundaries are established the argument that a
115.
116.

See Cox, Labor Law 63 (3d ed. 1954).
International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79 (1940).
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flexible standard is inadministrable will be dimmed. In the long run the
rule treats employers and unions less like mutual combatants by making
the parties work out their own ground rules under the peculiar circumstances of their case. To some degree it demotes law to the position of a
sword in the closet and, however slight the degree, it would seem to be a
move in the right direction.
CONCLUSION

It was observed in the first portion of the article that section 8(c)
has served as a basis for excusing employer comments that undoubtedly
influenced employees against freely considering unionization. If this
was the aim of the amendment it has fulfilled its mission. 7 To a large
extent the "totality of conduct" doctrine is presently followed by the
Board and the Board's practice has been accepted by the courts of
appeals. But it seems that the doctrine is more apt to be used today to
find statements privileged than nonprivileged." 8 Isolated instances where
employer statements were used to explain acts have been found but the
present statute continues to stand as an imposing and anomalous rule of
evidence regardless of Senator Taft's contrary remarks." 0
The consideration of the captive audience problem leads one to the
conclusion that the present treatment of the question is unsound both
from the standpoint of industrial practice and legal approach. Fundamentally section 8(c) is not in issue. It has served to divert attention
from the question of the degree of protection that employees will be
given under section 7.
In both inquiries section 8(c) served to cloud thinking about basic
issues. The lesson of the Board's and the courts' experience in the application of section 8(c) is that passage of a statute is not the way to
handle this type of delicate problem in labor relations. Even if action
to amend were a political reality, the solution would not lie here, in
legislative action. Enough harm has been done through this means. The
only feasible way to obtain any sensible result in these affairs is to allow
the administrative process personified by the NLRB to guide the way.
Although our federal system is in theory one of laws and not of men, for
the policy of any enactment to be carried forward, there is no substitute
for men dedicated to its cause.
117. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the
Senate, S3d Cong., 2d Sess, pt. 6 at 3231, where Mr. Boyd E. Payton of the T.W.U.A.
said, "We ascribe to the free speech and agency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act-more
than to any of its other objectionable provisions-our failure to organize tentile workers in
recent years." See also, Hearings, supra, at 3230 for the data upon which the statement
was based.
118. E.g., The Lux Clock Mffg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955).
119. See note 58 supra.

